We have received many helpful comments and suggestions from colleagues at HBS and elsewhere. We are particularly grateful to the discussants and session attendees at the AAA Congress in Anaheim in August 2013; the AAA Management Accounting Section conference in Orlando in January 2014, and to the participants of the accounting workshop at HEC Lausanne in November 2013.
With such an abundance of principles, guidelines, and standards, scholars might conclude that risk management is a mature discipline with proven unambiguous concepts and tools that need only regulations and compliance to be put into widespread practice. We disagree. We believe that risk management approaches are largely unproven and still emerging. Apparently, so do the many practitioners who have expressed dissatisfaction with the proposed normative and regulatory ERM frameworks (CFO Research Services and Towers Perrin 2008; Beasley, Branson, and Hancock 2010) . We also believe that much academic research treats ERM as selfevident and fails to answer if its usefulness can be proven by more than its apparent popularity. This paper begins with empirical findings on the current state of maturity of ERM as evidenced by a survey of academic research and by our own field research over the past decade.
While many empirical papers have documented the prevalence and effectiveness of ERM, we believe that they have produced few significant results, largely because the perspective they employ uses an inadequate and incomplete specification of how ERM is implemented in practice. We propose-based on a ten-year field project, involving over 250 interviews with chief risk officers and three detailed case studies-a more comprehensive specification of ERM and identify the parameters that could serve as a solid foundation for a contingency theory of ERM design and implementation.
We studied three organizations with risk management practices that were actively supported and used by senior management. Yet each organization had a completely different structure and role for its risk management function. Based on this diversity of effective risk management systems, we conclude that it is too soon to predict which of these structures will survive to be incorporated into a future common body of knowledge for an emerging risk management profession. Prematurely adopting standards and guidelines that aspire to be 4 "applicable to all organizations" and "all types of risk" (as advocated, for example, by ISO 31000) introduces a major risk into risk management by inhibiting companies from searching for and experimenting with innovative risk management processes that match their particular circumstances. All three companies' solutions may be right-even optimal-for them; and other solutions may emerge for other company contexts. By adopting a contingency approach to ERM research, we avoid recommending a universal risk management system that should be applied in all circumstances. Instead, we search for the specific circumstances that would guide the selection of an appropriate risk management system for an individual enterprise.
Past Research on ERM Adoption and Performance
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) defined ERM as "a process, effected by an entity's board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives" (COSO 2004, 6 ).
This description evokes Anthony's widely quoted definition of management control: "the process by which managers assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization's objectives" (Anthony 1965, 17) . COSO advocates that ERM become a strategic management control system ("applied in strategy setting … to provide … assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives"), just as the advocates of value-based management, activity-based management, the balanced scorecard, and other management control practices have preached. Unlike these other practices, however, ERM is not a measurement-centered practice. ERM focuses on "potential events" rather than on past performance and, therefore, has no uniquely identifiable measurement technology. Instead, ERM users have produced, over the years, a variety of tools and processes to explicate future eventualities. In any particular company's ERM mix (Mikes 2009 ), one might find risk maps based on risk identification and assessment processes, stress tests based on data collection and statistical analysis, and scenario analyses based on scenario envisionment and planning.
Despite the plethora of risk management tools and processes, many organizations remain dissatisfied with existing risk management practices-their own and others'. In a September 2008 survey of CFOs (CFO Research Services and Towers Perrin 2008) about the causes of the global financial crisis, 62 percent of respondents blamed poor or lax risk management at financial institutions, ahead of the 59 percent who blamed financial instrument complexity, and the 57 percent who blamed speculation. Seventy-two percent of respondents expressed concern about their own companies' risk management practices. A majority of respondents in a survey of more than 400 leaders of ERM processes, including 20 percent from financial services (Beasley et al. 2010) , reported dissatisfaction with their risk oversight processes; 42 percent described their risk oversight as "immature" or "minimally mature" and only three percent described theirs as "very mature." Risk management's plethora of guidelines, frameworks, and tools has provided a tempting subject for academic research. Academic studies of ERM, have started to explore the dependence of ERM performance outcomes on organizational context, however, they fall short of putting forward a contingency theory of ERM. We have classified this literature into three categories, corresponding to three common concerns: selection studies, performance studies, and variation studies.
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Selection Studies
In the first stream, the researchers attempt to use firm-specific contextual variables to explain the presence (or lack) of ERM. These studies mirror early contingency research in managerial and accounting research, which simply examined whether various plausible contingent factors (drivers) correlated with the control mechanism in question (Fisher, 1995) . So the first thrust of empirical research on risk management was to identify the contextual factors related to ERM adoption. Based on the normative literature (COSO 2004; International Standards Organisation 2009) , some studies verified the influence of boards and executive teams in securing ERM adoption (Beasley, Clune, and Hermanson 2005; Desender 2007 ), while others found the presence of an internal risk specialist to be associated with ERM adoption (Kleffner, Lee, and McGannon 2003; Beasley et al. 2005; Paape and Speklé 2012) .
Another common observation is that firms carrying higher risk of financial distress (as measured by leverage or volatility of operating cash flows) are more likely than less-risky ones to adopt ERM (Liebenberg and Hoyt 2003; Pagach and Warr 2011) . But empirical findings about some of the less-than-obvious contingency variables are mixed and even contradictory. Some studies identified firm size and industry affiliation as significant contingency factors (Colquitt, Hoyt, and Lee 1999; Beasley et al. 2005; Pagach and Warr 2011) , while others found them nonexplanatory (Liebenberg and Hoyt 2003) . Studies of the impact of institutional ownership and auditor influence have yielded mixed results (Liebenberg and Hoyt 2003; Pagach and Warr 2011; Paape and Speklé 2012) . As for regulatory pressure, Kleffner et al. (2003) reported that non-bank Canadian companies cited compliance with Toronto Stock Exchange guidelines as the third-most-important reason (37 percent) for their ERM adoption, confirming that nonfinancial firms also perceive external pressure to invest in ERM. Paape and Speklé (2012) found that stock exchange listing was correlated with ERM implementation in Europe but found no association with the existence of governance codes or risk management frameworks.
Implicitly embracing the "survival of the fittest" principle, selection studies assume that only firms with effective combinations of context and ERM are observed, as those with an inappropriate combination will not survive. However, this form of Darwinism would apply only if ERM were indeed a mature discipline or if researchers could verify the continuing existence of the associations initially found in cross-sectional studies. Given the evolving nature of ERM, selection studies have identified few significant and design-relevant ERM variables and have so far ignored the process whereby organizations, over time, attempt to match their ERM to firmspecific contingencies. Nevertheless, these initial inquiries spurred the second stream of empirical studies that tried to assess whether ERM practices, on average, have contributed to better firm performance.
Performance Studies
A second stream of research seeks to identify the performance implications of ERM implementations (Pagach and Warr 2010; Pagach and Warr 2011; Beasley, Pagach, and Warr 2008; Hoyt and Liebenberg 2011; Ellul and Yerramilli 2012; Baxter, Bedard, Hoitash, and Yezegel 2012) .
However, assertions about the value of ERM are not easy to establish in the face of a powerful financial economics paradigm that has, until very recently, been skeptical. From this perspective, shareholders can costlessly eliminate idiosyncratic risks through portfolio diversification so that any expenditure to establish and sustain a risk management function or to undertake risk-mitigating initiatives has a negative-net-present-value. Stulz (1996) The inconclusive nature of these studies spurred a debate on method questions to explain conflicting results, and on the whole, distracted researchers from a deeper problem: namely that this literature is merely "controlling for" contingencies, rather than "theorizing" them. They appear to be working from the assumption that ERM is universally good or bad -which is inherently not in the spirit of contingency theories.
Most of these studies-with the exception of Ellul and Yeramilli (2012) The essence of a contingency theory of ERM (beyond the simple selection / correlation studies) would be to find "fit" between contingent factors and firms' ERM practices, and to establish propositions of fit that will result in desired outcomes (for a review of contingency studies in management accounting, see for example Otley, 1980; Fisher, 1995; Chenhall, 2003 Chenhall, , 2006 . Moving towards a contingency theory of ERM requires a more sophisticated understanding of not only the nature of relevant contingencies, but also the nature of ERM itself.
There is now a growing strand of longitudinal field studies that tries to capture the fascinating variety of risk management practices in banking and elsewhere, deployed at different organizational levels, for different purposes, and by different staff groups-even by companies in the same industry. Studies that can embrace such important variation may end up explaining more about ERM, especially about what works and what does not.
Variation Studies
The third and emerging stream of empirical work on ERM uses small-sample or field studies to understand risk management in situ, as an organizational and social practice, and has compiled sufficient evidence to suggest that risk management practices vary considerably across firms, even within an industry (Tufano 1996; Mikes 2009; Mikes 2011) . In some firms, risk management takes the form of complex financial transactions (Tufano 1996; Chacko, Tufano, and Verter This diversity provides an opportunity to develop grounded theories by studying actual risk practices in actual organizations. Such studies help us conceptualize and identify practices that may advance ERM, even when the company doesn't call them risk management or when they are performed outside the risk function. In the remainder of this paper, we draw on existing longitudinal field research and on several case studies, written between 2007 and 2012, in order to (1) provide a practice-based definition of ERM, (2) explicate the variables that cause the observed variation in ERM systems, and (3) propose contingency variables that explain some of this variation, such as the nature and controllability of the firm's risks and the speed at which the firm's key uncertainties evolve.
A useful contingency theory must be more powerful than "it depends." The emerging theory should have an hypothesis about the specific linkages between organization-specific factors and the design of its ERM structure and systems, as well as a performance hypothesis about how improving the fit between an organization's specific factors and its ERM system design will improve its performance along specific, measurable dimensions.
Identifying Risk Management Processes
A former COSO chairman claimed (corresponding authors' interview with Larry Rittenberg) that any enterprise risk management approach should contain three components:
1. a strategic activity, addressing "potential events" that threaten the achievement of strategic objectives, 2. a governance activity, involving participation and oversight at multiple levels of management, and 3. a monitoring activity, based on the cybernetic control ideal of objective-setting (in the form of risk limits or risk appetite), measurement, feedback, and corrective action.
ERM systems with all three components, however, can still vary widely. Some firms may concentrate only on a narrow set of financial, insurable, or measurable events that threaten strategic objectives (Tufano 1996; Mikes 2009 ). Others address threats that encompass nonfinancial, qualitative issues as well (Mikes 2009; Woods 2009; Jordan, Jørgensen, and Mitterhofer 2013) . As will be shown in our case studies, the unit of analysis for risk management Often, managers and employees, especially under budget and time pressure, become so inured to particular risks that they override existing controls and accept deviances and near misses as the "new normal"-a behavior referred to as the normalization of deviance (Vaughan 1999) . By treating red flags as false alarms rather than as early warnings of imminent danger, they incubate more vulnerability to risk events. Firms also make the mistake of "staying on course" when they shouldn't. As events begin to deviate from expectations, managers instinctively escalate their commitment to their prior beliefs, "throw good money after bad," and incubate even more risk.
In addition to these individual biases, organizational biases, such as "groupthink," also inhibit good thinking about risks. Groupthink arises when individuals, still in doubt about a 14 course of action that the majority has approved, decide to keep quiet and go along. Groupthink is especially likely when the group is led by an overbearing, overconfident manager who wants to minimize conflict, delay, and challenges to his or her authority.
All these individual and group decision-making biases explain why so many organizations overlook or misread ambiguous threats and fail to foresee how bad things can happen to their good strategies.
Based on these considerations and on the characteristics of emerging ERM practices, we propose the following practice-based definition of ERM:
Enterprise risk management consists of active and intrusive processes that (1) 
Three Studies of Mature ERM Systems
For our case studies, we selected three companies in three industries-aerospace engineering, high-voltage electricity transmission, and fund management-and sought to uncover the explicit or implicit design choices they made for their risk management systems. The three companies' mature risk management systems had the following characteristics:
 Longevity: it had been in existence for at least five years.
 Visible: it had the active support of top management.
 Interactive: not just checklists and compliance, it employed intrusive risk management tools and processes.
 Multi-functional: it encouraged the discussion of risks across functional silos and organizational boundaries.
 Actionable: it linked to the resource allocation process.
 Leadership: its head was a visible, senior officer, with a direct reporting line to the chief executive or other C-suite executive.
We conducted 38 interviews within the three companies between 2008 and 2012 (see Appendix 1 for a list of case-specific interviews and dates) and have been conducting ongoing email communications and follow-up visits to confirm that the risk management mix in each company has indeed reached the degree of maturity that makes it of interest for contingency research; that is, that we could ask and answer the question, "Why did these ERM systems take their specific-and differing-forms?"
Case 1. Aerotech
Aerotech, a research and development center, managed capital-intensive, time-critical technological projects for the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) unmanned space missions. Despite some spectacular successes, Aerotech had had a mixed track record of managing risks. Its previous risk assurance function had focussed on checklists for quality control, which allowed many risks to incubate for a long time in functional silos only to emerge in unfortunate and rather spectacular failures.
In 2000, Aerotech hired a chief system engineer (CSE) to develop and implement a new risk management architecture that would significantly increase Aerotech's mission success rate.
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The CSE knew that his principal challenge was to counter the overconfidence and biases of engineers about the riskiness of their projects:
[Aerotech] engineers graduate from top schools at the top of their class. They are used to being right in their design and engineering decisions. I have to get them comfortable thinking about all the things that can go wrong. … Innovationlooking forward-is absolutely essential, but innovation needs to be balanced with reflecting backwards, learning from experience about what can go wrong.
The CSE introduced an independent and expert risk review board, which he chaired, to monitor the risks associated with each major project. The risk review board performed the following processes for every project:
1.
A meeting with project engineers at the beginning of every project to review and challenge the engineers' assessment of the major risks.
2.
Establish cost and time reserves, based on its assessments of the project's degree of innovation, to allow unforeseen problems to be solved during the course of the multiyear project without exceeding the project's budget or jeopardizing its scheduled launch date.
3.
Annual or biannual three-day meetings with the project team where it vigorously challenges and debates the project team's current risk assessments.
The CSE also met quarterly with project leaders to update the risk assessments.
The rigorous monitoring and governance processes motivated engineers to build robustness and reliability into their everyday design decisions rather than ignoring potential problems or taking shortcuts to bypass them. The link from the risk monitoring activity to a resource allocation activity (the cost and time reserves) gave the risk review board real power: it could reject or cancel projects that had inadequate funding to address the project's risks. As the project proceeded, the board could reallocate funds among project components and authorize disbursement from the cost reserves to employ tiger teams of outside experts to solve seemingly intractable design and engineering problems. As the launch date approached, the board recommended either that the launch proceed as planned or, if residual risks remained too high, 
Case 2. Electroworks
Electroworks, a major Canadian power utility, operated in an industry in which lack of reliability could lead not only to financial and asset damage but also to human injury and death.
The provincial regulatory agency had capped the price that Electroworks could charge, while also requiring it to lead conservation initiatives that would reduce future revenues and earnings.
Electroworks had to manage a complex web of conflicting interests-the agendas of government ministers, regulators, consumers, environmental groups, aboriginal (First Nation) landowners, and the capital-market debt-holders that had subscribed to the company's C$1 billion bond issue.
Its chief risk officer (CRO), originally hired from the banking industry to be the head of internal audit, had little domain expertise and was not an intrusive or hands-on risk manager.
With no formal qualifications to challenge Electroworks' engineers at risk assessment workshops and at resource allocation meetings, the CRO functioned as a facilitator not a devil's advocate.
His risk management department collected information about Electroworks' critical and material risks and distributed this information up, down, and across the enterprise. He established a "Chinese wall" to separate his internal audit role from his risk management one. Records of the risk workshops were kept confidential and separate from internal audit assessments and no one, besides himself, was involved in both activities. He had the strong backing of the CEO, who advocated a no-blame culture and encouraged people to speak up and report worrying deviances, issues, and potential threats.
Electroworks' CRO, along with a small team of risk managers, introduced a three-phase enterprise risk management program. In Phase 1, he organized a series of workshops at which employees collectively identified and quantified what they saw as the principal risks to the company's strategic objectives. These workshops used an anonymous voting technology that allowed employees to quantify, on a scale of 1 to 5, the impact of each risk discussed and its likelihood, having also assessed the strength of existing controls. These judgments were summarized into a risk map. Multiplying the likelihood and impact scores of each risk yielded a high-level ranking of the highest-priority risks to be mitigated. The risk map, albeit a simple and subjective tool, made it easier for people to discuss the proper focus of Electroworks' riskmitigating actions. 5 Each meeting concluded with a consensus on the principal risks identified, 5 Interestingly, the risk review workshops at Aerotech also used 5×5 risk maps to summarize the principal risks to the mission. While seemingly simplistic, especially for the PhD rocket scientists at Aerotech, the risk map's the actions recommended to cost-efficiently mitigate each principal risk, and the manager who would be accountable for taking the recommended actions for each risk.
In Phase 2, the CRO conducted biannual one-on-one interviews with senior managers to review the corporate risk profile and then presented the results to the CEO and the board. In Phase 3, conducted during the annual planning process, the senior executive team allocated hundreds of millions of capital investment dollars among investment projects that had been proposed to mitigate the company's principal risks. By tying the investment management process to risk assessment, this ERM process gave business managers an incentive to disclose rather than hide risks, so that they could obtain resources to mitigate them. The mantra was, "If you have no risk, you get no money." The investment management department rigorously screened project proposals before they were presented at the two-day annual resource allocation meeting. Those meetings, like Aerotech's risk review board meetings, were intensively interactive as risk managers challenged the engineers' "bang for the buck" investment proposals.
All three phases channeled risk information vertically and horizontally throughout the company, enabling executives and employees to develop a shared understanding of what risks the company faced and what had to be done about them. Indeed, the CRO attributed the success of ERM to its multiple points of "contact" with employees:
Enterprise risk management is a contact sport. Success comes from making contact with people. Magic occurs in risk workshops. People enjoy them. Some say, "I have always worried about this topic, and now I am less worried because I see that someone else is dealing with it, or I have learned it is a low-probability plain summary of highly complex phenomena was enough to generate active discussion and debate during the meetings.
event." Other people said, "I could put forward my point and get people to agree that it is something we should be spending more time on, because it is a high risk."
In 2008, the CRO of Electroworks and his team initiated so-called "black swan workshops," a separate process to focus executives' and board members' attention on lowprobability high-impact events that did not normally come up during risk workshops and face-toface meetings with executives. These discussions used a new framework for brainstorming-a separate risk map that allowed the comparison and ranking of potential "black swan events" based on the velocity of the underlying trend and the company's perceived resilience to such events. He described the workshops to us as "more a thought experiment than a risk workshop." Not a regular part of the risk management calendar, they were held on demand (but at least annually), whenever the board saw the need to discuss a particular low-probability disaster that had yet to show up among in the periodic risk updates. Insights from the black swan workshops were fed back into the company's disaster recovery plans.
Case 3. Wealthfund
Wealthfund, a private-asset management bank within a very large money-center financial institution, offered investment opportunities to clients in external and internally-managed funds.
It had an award-winning reputation for service and innovation in the global private banking business. Long-term client relationships, trust, and clients' private wealth were continually at stake and risk exposures changed frequently and rapidly. The bank's regulators, wary of its ample opportunities for self-dealing and conflicts of interest, required substantial due diligence on the external funds the bank offered its clients and even more on its internally-managed funds.
Regulators did not want investment managers directing client assets internally when there were better external options. Wealthfund's risk management function had to operate with independence and authority to approve the population of funds that asset managers could use and to ensure that all investment managers complied with external and internal requirements.
The focus of risk management between 2007 and 2010 was compliance with investment mandates across all teams and products despite market moves, liquidation requirements, and the portfolio managers' quest for gains in tumultuous markets. Risk managers also conducted an ongoing review of operational risks arising from breakdowns in documentation, clearing, and settlement or reporting. This was arguably more of an internal audit role, but there was a strong emphasis on the enforcement of controls aimed at risks that were liable to change in tumultuous markets.
After the onset of the global financial crisis, Wealthfund introduced another set of risk managers whose mandate was to work closely with managers within the business lines. Each "embedded" risk manager had dual reporting lines: one to the line manager and one to his or her own superior in the independent risk management function. One of the embedded risk managers explained the novelty of his dual responsibilities for improving the risk-adjusted returns for his managers' funds while protecting the portfolios from major downside shocks: A strongly independent rules and compliance function (as Wealthfund's risk management originally was) can, over time, be seen as so independent and removed from business operations that line managers consider it of no help to them in coping with strategy-execution issues.
Conversely, an embedded risk function, helping line managers address day-to-day risks, can "go native" and lose the independence required to maintain a strong compliance culture.
Wealthfund's risk function strived to create a dual (or hybrid) structure to be both independent overseer and business partner.
4.
Unpacking the "ERM Mix"
Our field studies (and others') illustrate different approaches and roles for the risk management function (Mikes 2009; Mikes, Hall and Millo, 2013; Power, Ashby and Palermo, 2013) . Some act as the independent overseer, with an exclusive focus on compliance and internal controls. Others have moved beyond this to a business partner role. For example, Aerotech's risk management is embedded within the formal planning and resource allocation process and also influences key strategic decisions, such as approval or veto of new projects and whether to approve the actual launch of a mission. In the independent facilitator role, exemplified at Electroworks, risk management does not influence formal decision making but does acquire agenda-setting power and information with which to facilitate risk communication across the organization and the discussion of key strategic uncertainties. In the dual or hybrid 24 role, exemplified at Wealthfund, the risk function balances compliance with business orientation by deploying separate groups of independent and embedded risk managers.
The variety of ERM implementation seen in our three case studies, taken together with other field findings, also suggests that any observed "ERM mix" can and should be unpacked into a set of fundamental risk management components. These components (and their determinants) include:
Processes for identifying, assessing, and prioritizing risks. Risk identification can take place face-to-face (as in our three cases) or through self-assessments prompted remotely by a centralized database or risk register (Mikes, Tufano, Werker, and De Neve, 2009 ). Face-to-face meetings can be intensive, interactive meetings between the risk expert and the line managers, as practiced at Aerotech and Wealthfund, or open discussions among employees from different functions, and hierarchical levels, as practiced at Electroworks. Risk discussions can be confined to senior line managers and staff or can be decentralized by engaging front-line, support, and administrative staff as well. Further research is required to explicate contextual factors that may influence the shape of risk identification process: but based on contingency research on management control systems (Simons 2005) , a number of organizational design parameters (span of control; span of accountability; span of influence and span of support), and the interdependencies in the task environment (Thompson, 1967) are likely to be relevant. For example, it was the reciprocal interdependencies across Aerotech's design teams that warranted wide span cross-silo risk discussions. At Electroworks and Wealthfund, where organizational and project units performed separate functions, the risk workshops were more focused on the project, department, business unit or portfolio at hand, and the range of participation in risk identification was determined by the diversity of functions involved in the management of these.
Frequency of risk meetings. Aerotech's project engineers had to make trade-offs between a mission's scientific goals and the immutable laws of physics. The risks associated with a particular mission were largely known by the end of the initial project meeting, and the laws of physics would not be changing during the course of the project. That helps to explain why formal updates on project risks could be adequately assessed at annual or biannual risk review meetings.
In contrast, Electroworks's risks-from changes in demand, regulation, interest rates, and equipment-evolved continually, so it held risk workshops throughout the year, and led semiannual senior executive face-to-face risk assessments, and annual resource allocation meetings. Wealthfund's risks changed hourly, and even from one trade to the next, requiring continuous monitoring and assessment by embedded risk managers. We conclude from this variety that the frequency of risk identification and assessment processes must match the velocity of risk evolution, a bit of common sense that nevertheless tends to be lost in a "one size fits all,"
rules-based compliance framework.
Risk tools. Most companies use multidimensional visualizations, such as risk maps, to quantify risks along likelihood, impact, and controllability dimensions (Jordan et al. 2013 ).
Electroworks and Aerotech conducted regular assessments and reviews of their high-level subjective rankings of their "top 10 risks." Companies, such as Wealthfund, with extensive historical data on asset pricing, covariance, and risk events go beyond simple risk map summaries by introducing data-and analysis-intensive statistical assessments, such as value-atrisk calculations and stress tests. We conclude from this variety that the choice of risk tools, ranging from qualitative descriptions and scenarios to the measurement of expected and unexpected loss, will be conditioned by (1) the availability of data and knowledge about a particular risk (loss) and (2) how relevant and reliable the available risk tools are in the eyes of 26 risk experts and everyone else using the tools.
Field research in financial services, where the raw data for risk analysis tends to be plentiful, suggests that the selection of particular risk tools tends to be associated with the firm's calculative culture-the measurable attitudes that senior decision makers display towards the use of sophisticated risk models (Mikes 2008; Mikes 2009; Mikes 2011 
How Risk Types Also Matter
Beyond dimensions related to the organizational context for risk management, Kaplan and Mikes (2012) introduced a taxonomy for classifying different types of risks events. Each of the taxonomy's three risk categories-preventable, strategy, and external-has a different source, a different degree of controllability, and a different approach for identification, mitigation, and management (see Table 1 ).
-------INSERT But that should not be the control objective for this category of risk. As external risks are, by definition, unavoidable and impossible to predict, the concern should be with the organization's resilience, should they occur. The assessment (and enhancement) of organizational resilience requires that the company introduce a process of risk envisionment-using experience, intuition, and imagination-to suggest plausible future disaster scenarios. Once a particular risk has been envisioned, managers can contemplate how the organization can respond-is their current resilience adequate to cope in the future, or does it need to be increased? 
Towards a contingency framework for ERM
All three of our case studies explicitly addressed strategy execution risks. Aerotech's CSE believed that strategy risks are greatest when "the project's engineering enters territory we have never experienced before." He focused his new risk management processes on the risks from high innovation, leaving "business-as-usual risks" to internal controls and the existing quality assurance process. He stated, "we are familiar with those risks and know how to quantify and mitigate them."
Electroworks' risk function embraced a focus on strategy risks from the beginning. More recently, the CRO and his team initiated so-called "black swan workshops," a separate process to envision uncontrollable, external (Category III) risks, and to check the organization's resilience to those risk events and the capabilities of its disaster management systems.
In contrast, Wealthfund's risk management department started off solely as an independent overseer (compliance function), which kept its risk managers isolated from the line business units. However, as the department's risk managers accumulated business-relevant expertise and as the line units began to request front-line risk management support, the department deployed embedded risk managers to address the rapidly-evolving strategy risks that emerged from volatile capital markets.
The only common characteristic in the three companies' risk management approaches was the use of highly interactive processes to address strategy execution risks, the risk review meetings at Aerotech, employee risk assessment meetings at Electroworks, and face-to-face interactions at Wealthfund. These intensive interactions provoked the dialogue and debate necessary to overcome biases (Hammond et al. 2006; Kahneman et al. 2011 ) that keep people from thinking rigorously about risks and bad outcomes. The meetings identified and assessed key strategy risks and helped managers select cost-efficient risk initiatives, something that cannot be achieved by filling out and auditing checklists or installing Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC) software.
All three companies, however, differed on their scope of their risk management function.
Aerotech focused only on the risks from its strategic portfolio of unmanned space missions.
Wealthfund's risk function managed both preventable and compliance risks as well as strategy risks, while Electroworks left preventable risks to its internal audit department, while its risk function managed strategy risks and, recently, board and senior executive deliberations about 30 external risks.
The three firms also had very different time cycles for their risk management processes.
Aerotech performed its rigorous risk assessments annually or bi-annually; Electroworks conducted risk assessments throughout the year; and Wealthfund analyzed risk exposures minute by minute, even trade by trade.
As for the risk officers themselves, Aerotech's CSE and Wealthfund's CRO, facing highrisk technical problems, had deep domain expertise and the self-confidence to credibly challenge the assumptions or veto the decisions of highly expert and self-confident project engineers and investment managers. The Electroworks CRO dealt with an array of enterprise risks ranging from regulation, financing, and human resources to ice storms and aboriginal access rights. Since no individual could have expertise in these multiple domains, the CRO and his group facilitated information production and dissemination for decision making; they did not make or veto riskbased resource allocation decisions. For major investment decisions, the CRO collaborated with experts in the investment planning department-themselves former field and project engineersto engage interactively and rigorously with current project engineers. Table 2 summarizes the case comparisons and outlines the design parameters that differentiate the three ERM processes.
--------INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE-------
Managing preventable (undesirable) risks should not be contingent on organizational structure and strategy. Proven tools and processes to manage preventable risks exist and their implementation can be standardized (see structural safeguards, system safeguards and staff safeguards in Simons, 2000: 284-288) . In contrast, the tools for managing strategy and external risks are still evolving and must vary with strategy-specific and firm-specific variables.
We have suggested several plausible and testable propositions about the fit between contingent variables, such as risk type (and other organizational or industry variables), and the ERM mix. We propose a framework (see Figure 1 ) that unpacks the ERM mix into its building blocks. It aligns specific ERM practices with the specific risk types they best address. This proposed matching-a "minimum necessary contingency framework" (Otley 1980 )-enables empirical researchers to collect data and test hypotheses about "fit" and "outcomes"
(organizational effectiveness). Although the measurement of organizational effectiveness will ultimately be the test of a contingency theory of ERM, the complexity of forces affecting organizational performance may initially call for the use of intervening variables as dependent variables in research studies. Initially, user satisfaction surveys and managerial perceptions of the ERM function are potential indicators of ERM effectiveness (Otley 1980) , as is the very tenure and maturity of the risk management function, as we found in our cases.
-------INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE----------Given the evolving nature of risk control, it is unclear which of the tools and practices now in use will ultimately make up a "common body of knowledge" that can define the profession of enterprise risk management. Today, the job of identifying risks and helping business lines manage them falls not only to risk specialists, but also to internal auditors, strategic planners, finance staff, and management accountants (Rizzi, Simkins, and SchoeningThiessen 2011; Grant Thornton Advisory Services 2012) . ERM may indeed evolve into an "umbrella function" for the discussion of certain (or all) kinds of risk. Its advocates, the risk managers, may gain control of important organizational agendas, such as planning, resource 32 allocation, and reward systems and be able to standardize tools and reports that allow their companies to manage universal risk concerns. On the other hand, ERM may remain highly contingent on situational politics, opportunities, and demands, "plugging" the control gaps left unaddressed by other control agents. Either way, its success or failure depends on whether risk managers succeed in making their function both seem and be important to the control agents and processes already in place.
We encourage future research to refine our practice-based definition of risk management and to complete and operationalize the contingency variables we identified. With a sufficiently complete set of contingency building blocks, researchers will be able to better conceptualize "fit", along the lines of progress made in management accounting research (Burkert et al., 2013 
